Authority inside the firm: multiple mechanisms of coordination by Baudry, Bernard & Tinel, Bruno
Authority inside the firm: multiple mechanisms of
coordination
Bernard Baudry, Bruno Tinel
To cite this version:
Bernard Baudry, Bruno Tinel. Authority inside the firm: multiple mechanisms of coordination.
2004. <halshs-00270905>
HAL Id: halshs-00270905
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00270905
Submitted on 7 Apr 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
Authority inside the firm: multiple mechanisms of coordination 
 
Bernard Baudry 
Bruno Tinel 
Abstract 
 
In the last twenty years, through a growing awareness of contractual incompleteness, the 
concept of authority has regained primacy in the analysis of the employment relationship. 
This article pursues two goals. First, we assess the famous controversy between Coase and 
Alchian and Demsetz via an analysis of the foundations of intra-firm authority. Second, we 
argue that intra-firm authority cannot hinge on a single variable and, to the contrary, rests on 
multiple mechanisms. The employer’s authority over the employee is therefore not binary – 
infinite or null – and should be understood in terms of degree.  
 
JEL classification: B21, D23, J53, L22, M50 
Keywords:  
 
In The Limits of Organization, Kenneth Arrow devotes an entire chapter to the role of 
authority in organizations. He thus writes that “among the most widespread characteristics of 
organizations is the prevalence of authoritative allocation. Virtually universally, in 
organizations of any size, decisions are made by some and carried out by others” (Arrow, 
1974, p.63). Arrow underlines the value of authority as a coordination device in organizations 
whenever incentives and/or information diverge between organization members. This analysis 
of authority, while crucially considering authority as a coordination device, is not in any way 
innovative. Indeed, important work on intra-organizational and thus intra-firm authority has 
preceded this analysis both in organization theory and in economics.1 
 
In economics, the two most cited works are Ronald Coase’s (1937) path-breaking article and 
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz’s (1972) article, the latter being in a sense a response to 
the former. While Coase considers that authority is the distinguishing mark of the firm 
relatively to the market, Alchian and Demsetz believe that authority cannot be the basis of 
such a comparison since the employer has no more authority over his employee than a 
consumer over his grocer. Stemming from this argument, in an important set of papers, 
economists interested in intra-firm coordination mechanisms have analyzed the nature of the 
firm and of intra-firm authority. 
 
During the 1970’s, the general recognition of contractual incompleteness has led to a new 
surge in the debate about the concept of authority. Oliver Williamson’s (1975) work in 
particular paved the way to the analysis of devices capable of filling in the blanks contained in 
the ex ante contract during its ex post execution, especially in the presence of conflicts of 
interest. Here, the function of authority, in relation to other incentive mechanisms, is clearly 
the filling in of these contractual blanks. In relation to this argument, Claude Ménard’s (1994) 
contribution must be noted as an effort to establish a clear-cut line between the concepts of 
authority and hierarchy, both considered as different forms of a larger concept of 
                                                 
1
 At least two authors are worth mentioning here: Max Weber and Chester Barnard. However, while Barnard 
develops a consensual and quasi-horizontal conception of authority, Weber insists on the vertical character of 
authority in his model of bureaucracy with authority hinging on competence as well as on legal rules.  
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commandment. However, in the present article, we do not pursue this distinction and 
concentrate solely on the concept of authority as defined by Herbert Simon (1951).2 
 
In this paper, we are specifically focusing on a question raised by Oliver Hart (1995): why 
does an individual inside the firm, i.e., an employee, obey the person in whom authority is 
vested, i.e., the employer? (p.57) Mentioning Alchian and Demsetz’s argument, Hart correctly 
notes that an independent firm can also give orders to another firm (ibid.). The issue, central 
to the debate between Coase and Alchian and Demsetz, is why does an employee obey while 
an independent firm does not necessarily do so? 
 
Related to this question, our objective is twofold. First, we analyze the foundations of intra-
firm authority using what we consider the major achievements in this area in order to shed 
new light on the aforementioned debate. Can these foundations account for the difference 
between the employment relation and the sales contract? Second, we show that the intra-firm 
authority relation, complex as it is, cannot be resumed by a unique variable and on the 
contrary rests on plural mechanisms. Thus, taking into account this plurality, we show that 
that in fine the authority relation between the employer and the employee should be 
apprehended in terms of degree and not as a binary variable – infinite or null. 
 
Our problem thus stated, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the first part, we 
analyze what we regard as the foundations of the authority relation. These are based on the 
specificity of the employment relation in terms both of power and the particular legal 
contractual link between the employer and the employee. Power is crucial because the 
employment relation, contrary to the ordinary sales contract between two independent agents, 
is the confrontation of two owners of different but complementary specific assets, namely 
non-human assets and human assets. But the employment relation is also a contractual 
relation structured by particularly clear-cut legal rules since the labor contract implies the 
legal subordination of the employee as shown by Scott Masten (1988). Case law repeatedly 
reveals the substantial differences between the labor contract and the sales contract. Having 
thus analyzed the foundations of intra-firm authority, we revisit the debate between Coase and 
Alchian and Demsetz. 
 
However, as we discuss in the second part, these foundations are only part of the story. The 
analysis of the functioning of the authority relation reveals two other mechanisms that are 
manifest at different points of the employment relation. As shown by Raghuram Rajan and 
Luigi Zingales and by Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, the employee can create and use 
specific resources created by her specific human assets. Such resources reshape the power 
relation between the employer and the employee and thus change the degree of authority. 
Furthermore, Simon, Williamson, as well as David Kreps, show that the employer-employee 
relation, at least at the time of conclusion of the contract, implies the employee’s implicit 
commitment of voluntary acceptance of the employer’s authority. Again, the level of 
engagement influences the degree of authority between the two parties. 
 
We conclude with a global explanation of intra-firm authority relations based on the plurality 
of mechanisms that regulate them. It is this pluralism that determines the degree of authority 
of an employer and an employee. 
                                                 
2
 According to Simon, if x is an element of all the employee’s possible behavior patterns in the context of his job,  
“we will say that B [boss] exercises authority over W [worker] if W permits B to select x. That is, W accepts 
authority when his behavior is determined by B’s decision” (Simon, 1951, p.294, emphasis in original).  
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Foundations of the authority relation: ownership of non-human assets and 
legal rules 
 
We believe that the foundations of the intra-firm authority relation lie at two different but 
complementary levels. These foundations are to be found in the combined effect of the 
ownership of non-human assets, which leads to the employer’s power over an employee, and 
the legal rules of employment, which are the basis of the employee’s subordination vis-à-vis 
the employer.  
 
 
Ownership of non-human assets, power and authority relations 
 
Asset ownership is the center-piece of the incomplete contracting approach, also known as the 
property rights theory, developed by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and 
Hart (1995).3 Beyond its particular formalization, the approach develops an original 
perspective of the economic meaning of contractual incompleteness. Without denying the 
importance of transaction costs, GHM look at incompleteness in relation to asset ownership 
and more specifically to the incentive effects of property rights. Since incomplete contracts 
cannot, by definition, specify all possible uses of an asset in all possible states of nature, 
decision rights in circumstances not provided for by contract become important. In the 
property rights framework, such residual control rights are synonymous with ownership, with 
residual rights of control defined as the right to choose those missing aspects of usage in any 
way not inconsistent with prior contract, custom or law.  
 
This being said, GHM go on to argue that agents are more inclined to develop specific 
relational investments when they own the assets that make their productive effort more 
valuable. With ownership of an asset providing the right to decide on its usage, this implies 
that the owner can exclude any other agent from using or working with the asset at her 
discretion. This discretionary possibility of exclusion that goes with ownership is assimilated, 
in GHM’s theory, to power.4 Given this identity, power is necessarily indirect: all power 
stems from and passes through asset ownership.5 
 
What are the implications for the analysis of the employment relationship? Hart (1995) 
mentions Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) discussion of the uncertain sources of intra-firm 
authority but states that the correct question is: why is an employee more responsive to what 
the employer wants than is an independent contractor? “In the former case, if the relationship 
breaks down, the employer walks away with all the nonhuman assets, whereas in the latter 
                                                 
3
 Henceforth, we refer to these authors as GHM. The incomplete contracting approach rigorously generalizes the 
pre-existing hold-up framework developed by Williamson (1975), Goldberg (1976) and Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian (1978) around the idea of appropriable quasi-rents. For a recent literature review, see Malcomson (1997) 
who curiously does not mention Goldberg and Klein et al. For a synthesis of recent developments of the 
incomplete contracting literature, see the January 1999 special issue of the Review of Economic Studies. For a 
methodological evaluation of the incomplete contacting literature, from the point of view of the complete 
contract framework, see Tirole (1999). Finally, for a critique of the main results of GHM-type models, see 
Holmström and Roberts (1998) and Holmström (1999).  
4
 In his introduction to his book, Hart (1995) uses control and power interchangeably. Power, a term that appears 
around twenty times between page 3 and page 6, thus means residual rights of control. 
5
 Ownership cannot be the source of power if contracts are complete. In a world in which it is possible to write 
such contracts, all possibilities would be provided for in advance and no agent would benefit from residual 
control rights, i.e., from power. In such a case, ownership would not be the source of power and would only 
provide a specific income.  
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case each independent contractor walks away with some nonhuman assets. This difference 
gives the employer leverage. Individual i is more likely to do what individual j wants, if j can 
exclude i from assets the i needs to be productive than if i can take these assets with her. (…) 
In other words, control over nonhuman assets leads to control over human assets” (Hart, 
1995, p.58, emphasis in original). 
 
Why does an employee obey the employer? Because the employer can deprive the employee 
of the assets he works with. The employer’s authority is thus indirect, stemming from the 
ownership of the non-human assets. In other words, the employer does not exert any direct 
power over the employee. The employer’s power of decision – who works with which asset – 
thus also confers authority in Simon’s sense over the employee. Intra-firm authority is 
therefore based on the property of the means of production.6 
 
This notion according to which the authority relation rests on the ownership of non-human 
assets pre-supposes several hypotheses that need to be discussed. Indeed, to assume that the 
employer’s authority stems from a credible threat, i.e., the employee will be deprived of the 
assets he works with if he does not obey, implies that (1) the non-human assets in question are 
indispensable for the employee in order to be productive and thus to receive income and that 
(2) the human assets of the employee are not indispensable for the employer.7  
 
Thus, from the start, there is no symmetry between the employer and the employee since the 
latter is economically dependent on the former. The employee has few if any alternatives to 
valorize his productive effort outside the specific relationship with the employer (the owner of 
the means of production in person or a representative). Therefore, the employee’s labor force 
is not redeployable without considerable cost. On the other hand, the employer does not 
depend on the employee. To be sure, if the relationship were to end, the employer would not 
lose his total income. And in any case, the employer will seek to organize production in such 
a manner as to make the employee replaceable at a low cost (cf. infra). 
 
In sum, residual control rights are a manifestation of power over objects – a power that leads 
to authority over men. The employee obeys the employer, or in a sense anticipates the 
employer’s desires and acts accordingly, because (1) the employee possesses his human assets 
only and (2) needs the non-human assets owned by the employer in order to obtain an income. 
The employee is thus economically dependent on the employer. The employer’s authority 
stems from the credible threat of termination that this dependence creates. However, this 
approach overestimates the employer’s power and thus remains incomplete. The actual 
functioning of authority is not explained since the resources at the employee’s disposal, 
limiting the employer’s power, are ignored. The cooperative aspect of the employment 
relation is also overlooked. Finally, the institutional environment in which the authority 
relation is embedded is also passed over. We next turn to this last point. 
 
                                                 
6
 However, the incomplete contracting approach does not give any indications as to how the authority relation 
might actually work. Hart and Moore (1990, p.1153) simply state that in their model, “an employer never has to 
tell an employee what to do: the employee simply figures it out himself and acts accordingly.” 
7
 In Marxian terms, the worker sells his labor force for a wage. Curiously, Hart considers that the question of the 
allocation of power in contractual relations is not all that different from the Marxian framework: “Given its 
concern with power, the approach proposed in this book has something in common with Marxian theories of the 
capitalist-worker relationship, in particular, with the idea that an employer has power over a worker because the 
employer owns the physical capital the worker uses (and therefore can appropriate the worker’s surplus). (…) 
The connection between the two approaches has not so far been developed in the literature, however” (Hart, 
1995, p.5, fn.5).  
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The institutional foundations of the authority relation: legal subordination 
 
As we have seen, ownership of non-human assets can be the source of the employer’s power 
of direction over employees, a power that leads to authority. However, ownership is not the 
only source of this authority. Indeed, the law, via a certain number of rules, institutes the 
subordination of the employee and thus the employer’s authority by imposing constraints and 
obligations on the employee. 
 
In this context, Scott Masten’s (1988) paper dedicated to the nature of the firm is exemplary. 
Masten identifies the aspects that differentiate the firm from the market by going through the 
provisions of employment law compared to commercial contract law as well as through case 
law. Noting the peculiar eviction of the actual institutional environment from the economic 
theories of the firm, Masten adopts a rather atypical position among economists. In discussing 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s (1976) “nexus of contracts” approach in which it 
makes little sense to distinguish those elements that are “inside” the firm from those 
“outside”, Masten indicates the contradiction in their view of the importance of the legal 
system: “This view of the firm points up the important role which the legal system and the 
law play in social organizations, especially, the organization of economic activity” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, p.311). Indeed, Masten continues, along the very path that Jensen and 
Meckling avoid, “does the law (…) treat commercial and employment transactions 
equivalently?” (Masten, 1988, p.185). His answer to this question goes through two phases.8 
We briefly summarize the proposed approach and its main results before proposing a critical 
review. 
 
First of all, Masten seeks to ascertain whether any rights or authority (rights, authority or 
responsibility in original) are vested in the employer in any way different from those 
available in commercial transactions, i.e., between independent firms. The compelling 
conclusion is that the law does not treat equivalently commercial transactions and the 
employment relation: “the investigation reveals that the law does in fact recognize substantial 
differences in obligations, sanctions and procedures governing the two types of exchange” 
(ibid., p.196). An individual entering an employment relation “accepts an implied duty to 
“yield obedience to all reasonable rules, orders and instructions of the employer”” (ibid., 
p.185). This is all the more apparent from the criteria used by courts to establish the nature of 
a particular transaction. In the employment relation, authority and control are used not only 
with regard to the outcome but also with regard to the manner in which the work is 
performed. This is not the case of the commercial transaction in which control can only apply 
to the outcome.9 Masten can therefore conclude that “the traditional emphasis in economics 
on the authority of management to direct the efforts of employees is at least nominally 
supported by the law governing employment transactions” (ibid., p.186). 
 
In the second essential phase, Masten looks for the existence of specific mechanisms allowing 
the effective enforcement of authority inside the firm, i.e., the means at the employer’s 
disposal ensuring that orders are carried out. If the employer’s authority rests solely on the 
threat of dismissal then the “authority of management is no different from that of an 
                                                 
8
 In his study, Masten analyzes not only authority but also other legally related issues. In particular, among other 
properties of the employment contact relative to the commercial contract, the formers flexibility and capacity of 
reducing asymmetric information between the employer and the employee. We focus here only on the first issue 
of authority.  
9
 This is also the definition of the employment relation that can be found in Coase (1937).  
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independent transactor engaged in ordinary market exchange” (ibid., p.188), the nominal duty 
of obedience notwithstanding. Indeed, the threat of termination is the only sanction that an 
independent contractor can impose. Thus, to base intra-firm authority solely on termination is 
to adhere to Alchian and Demsetz’s position on the absence of a distinguishing mark of the 
employment relation.  
 
However, an examination of the large bodies of case law governing both the employment 
relation and the commercial contract reveals that termination is not the only means of sanction 
at the employer’s disposal. An employee may be held liable for prejudice to his employer’s 
business were he to fail upholding his duties. This duty of loyalty obligating the employee to 
act in the employer’s interest is quite different from the matter of loyalty in commercial 
transactions which is strictly a matter of business judgment.10 Thus, “the important point is 
that the law entitles an employer to recover damages from a disloyal or uncooperative 
subordinate and thereby differentiates the incentives of employees from those of independent 
contractors in a discrete fashion, altering the payoff to uncooperative employee behavior in a 
way that arguably supports the authority commonly attributed to employers in the theory of 
the firm” (ibid., p.189). In contradiction with Alchian and Demsetz, this means that the law’s 
effect is that the employee, wishing to keep his job, has stronger incentives to comply to the 
employer’s orders – and thus to accept the employer’s authority – than does an independent 
transactor vis-à-vis another independent contractor.  
 
In sum, it is possible to synthesize Masten’s analysis in the following manner. 
/ First, legal rules institutionalize the economic power of direction of the employer, power 
stemming from the ownership of non-human assets. The law guarantees the employer’s 
freedom in the use of the assets (activity creation, organization of production). 
/ Second, legal rules provide resources complementary to those created by ownership by 
establishing the employee’s legal subordination via an employment contract. It is in this sense 
that, within the limits of the law, the employer can “complete” the employment contract 
whenever unforeseen contingencies may arrive. 
/ Third, from the point of view of the employer, legal rules create the possibility of sanctions 
other than those stemming simply from the ownership of non-human assets. 
Masten’s paper highlights the fundamental richness of pluridisciplinarity and contributes to 
assessing the importance of the institutional environment in terms of the choice of governance 
structures – an aspect most economists ignore in analyzing intra-firm authority. 
 
We retain all of Masten’s essential points except an important one related to the distinction 
between the employment relation and the sales contract. Contrary to Masten, we do not 
believe that the sanction of termination is the same in both cases since the consequences of 
termination are quite different. In the case of two independent contractors, each agent keeps 
her non-human assets and thus the possibility of other business. In the case of the employment 
relation, however, as is shown by Hart, the employee keeps only her human assets. This is a 
source of the employer’s power and such power is not available to the independent 
contractor.11 Thus, to imply that intra-firm authority cannot solely hinge on the threat of 
dismissal because in the absence of such a threat there would not be any elements specific to 
the employment relation (as in Alchian and Demsetz) is to deny that the presence of non-
human assets is indispensable in the employment relation (see supra). The nature of this 
                                                 
10
 The same is true in France. 
11
 Except in the low probability case in which an independent contractor is 100 % dependent on another 
contractor. In this case, courts would probably requalify the relation as an employment one.  
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relation is very different from the relation of a grocer to a customer, or between two 
independent firms, because no specific asset is attached to the latter relation.  
 
 
The first part of this paper evaluated the Coase/Alchian-Demsetz controversy on authority. An 
analysis of the foundations of intra-firm authority clearly reveals the differences between the 
employment relation and the ordinary sales contract between two independent transactors. 
These differences explain why an employee obeys whereas an independent contractor does 
not necessarily do so. On one hand, in the employment relation, the owner of the non-human 
assets deprives the dismissed employee access to these assets and thus of an income whereas 
in a commercial transaction, each agent retains his non-human assets.12 On the other hand, in 
terms of obligations and sanctions, the legal rules applicable in the employment context are 
quite different from those applicable in the context of the sales contract. As opposed to the 
legal equality of the parties to a commercial contract, the employer’s authority is established 
by law.  
 
 
Functioning of the authority relation: specific human assets and implicit 
contracts 
 
An analysis of the foundations of intra-firm authority is not sufficient: the analysis of its 
actual functioning reveals two mechanisms situated at two different moments of the 
employment relation that influence the degree of authority. In particular, the employee 
possesses specific resources that counterbalance the employer’s power stemming from the 
ownership of non-human assets. These resources are the employer’s own human assets that 
develop during the course of the employment relation. The second mechanism is related to the 
cooperative dimension of the employment relation: at the time of conclusion of the contract, 
the employee freely enters the organization that employs him and thus accepts the employer’s 
authority. 
 
 
Specific human assets, the employee’s power and the authority relation 
 
The preceding discussion of the respective roles of the ownership of the means of production 
and of the institutional environment in the employment relation leaves the impression that the 
employee disposes of no resources of his own limiting the employer’s authority. Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) and Aghion and Tirole (1997) have recently shown that this is not the case. 
Without implying that the employment relation is perfectly balanced – in fact, an imbalance in 
the employer’s favor is here considered efficient – these authors consider that the employer’s 
authority over the employee is limited by the specificity of the employee’s human assets as 
well as by informational asymmetries.  
 
The role of asset specificity 
 
The employee has, in certain cases, an important resource at his disposal in order to limit the 
employer’s authority: his human capital. Human capital can be a source of power only if it 
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 One could object that the independent contractor also loses access to a client but, as we have indicated in the 
preceding footnote, total dependence of an independent contractor is extremely rare whereas virtually all 
employees depend on a unique employer for income.  
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may be sufficiently valorized. Rajan and Zingales develop this idea through the notion of 
“access”, defined as the “ability to use, or work with, a critical resource. If the critical 
resource is a machine, access implies the ability to operate the machine; if the resource is an 
idea, access implies being exposed to the details of the idea; if the resource is a person, access 
is the ability to work closely with the person. The agent who is given privileged access to the 
resource gets (…) the opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make 
herself valuable” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, p.388).13 Access affects the balance of power 
between the employer and the employee in at least two manners. First, access conditions the 
specialization potential of the employee and, second, this potential is more or less strong 
depending on the degree of exclusion that the access involves.  
 
The central idea, absent in GHM’s theory, is that ownership may not provide sufficient 
incentive for engaging in a specific productive investment. In fact, specialization in certain 
tasks may destroy the owner’s outside options. In this case, granting the employee access to 
the non-human assets, instead of assigning simply property rights, may actually improve his 
productivity since “insecurity [related to the absence of property rights] may encourage rather 
than discourage specific investment by stakeholders” (ibid., p.424, emphasis in original).14 
The idea is straightforward: access to certain critical resources allows the employee to 
specialize his human capital through a learning procedure. Therefore, access thus fosters the 
accumulation of specific human assets that may be more or less complementary to the non-
human assets owned by the employer. Specialization thus can make the employee more or 
less indispensable to the owner of the means of production, affecting the balance of power.15 
 
Power is exercised differently by owners and non-owners. The power of the owner of non-
human assets is effective only in the absence of bilateral monopoly, i.e., if several workers 
compete for the use of the non-human assets in a rat race. However, the non-owner (i.e., 
employee) draws power only from the relation that binds him to the owner (i.e., employer). 
Put differently, specialization is a no-return commitment (the agent specializing burns his 
boats) in that it seals the non-owner’s destiny to that of the non-human asset to which access 
has been granted without damage to the value of the outside options. This implies that the 
situation is somewhat closer to a bilateral monopoly than the employer would have liked in 
order to fully exercise his power. The employee counterbalances the employer’s power 
without having authority over him in Simon’s sense, i.e., in the sense of being able to give 
orders to the employer. 
 
Residual rights of control are thus not the only source of power. Access to “critical 
resources”, be they human or non-human assets, allows employees to develop their human 
                                                 
13
 Rajan and Zingales do not define precisely the concept of “critical resources” which is crucial to their analysis. 
While the idea is intuitively appealing, a clarification would allow a better understanding to who in the firm 
might develop such specific assets in order to gain power. 
14
 Rajan and Zingales use the example of an island economy in which a tanner (T) tries to enlist one or several 
cobblers (C) in an enterprise making leather shoes in order to answer the question of the ownership of the unique 
sewing machine. Whereas the property rights approach would argue that ownership should be assigned to the 
cobbler that is to engage in important specific investments, Rajan and Zingales show that with ownership the 
cobbler in question may actually reduce his specific investment if this reduces his outside options. This result 
seems close to an argument of Holmström and Milgrom (1991) according to whom asset ownership may be 
efficient only if the variance of asset returns is low. Indeed, it seems plausible to assume that the variance of 
asset returns is an increasing function of specialization in Rajan and Zingales’ sense. 
15
 This idea can also be found in Williamson for whom employees may choose between specializing to the assets 
specific to a firm or not. Those choosing the second option have the possibility of working for a larger number of 
employers (Williamson, 1985, p.259). However, for those that chose the first option, the threat of termination is 
less credible. 
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capital and to become indispensable.16 This is why Rajan and Zingales consider access as a 
form of power able to limit the employer’s authority. However, this limitation can only be 
effective in a second stage. In the first stage, the power of decision of granting some 
employees access to these assets lies with the owner (or with his representative). In other 
words, the employee’s limiting power is subordinated to that of the employer. Employees to 
whom access is not granted are not able to develop their own specific human assets through 
which future power may be gained. For these agents, the “degree” of authority is quite strong. 
 
Access to critical resources represents an important stake for the protagonists since it 
contributes to the future distribution of power. The employer’s incentive is to limit as much as 
possible access to the critical resources in order to avoid giving the employees too much 
power. This leaves him with more power and allows for their easy replacement. The employer 
has to trade off loss of control and productive efficiency (productivity gains). On the other 
hand, of course, each employee seeks to gain as much access as possible. How should the 
employer decide which agent should be granted access to which resource? We consider this 
issue below. 
 
Rajan and Zingales next discuss the influence of the type of technology involved on the 
employees’ capacity to limit the employer’s authority. Specifically, a productive organization 
based on the additivity of tasks allows (1) employees to have a strong incentive to specialize 
while (2) limiting their power vis-à-vis the employer. To the contrary, production techniques 
requiring substitutable or complementary tasks lead to sufficient investment only if 
accompanied by exclusive access rights.17 Those granted such exclusive access rights gain 
power vis-à-vis the owner of the non-human assets. This implies that whenever the firm 
owners or their representatives fail to organize labor by breaking up tasks in order to render 
them additive, they face a trade-off. Either the employer grants exclusive access rights to a 
small number of employees who thus may specialize or no one gets access rights, the outcome 
being lower output. Wishing to raise the output, the employer does grant access rights to 
some. But, of course, those who specialize gain hold-up power, since exclusivity creates a 
local monopoly – the specialized are indispensable. The employer can now himself be 
excluded from the human assets of the employee. Such a possibility limits the scope of the 
employer’s authority. 
 
In this story, technology is chosen endogenously. On one hand, the technical characteristics of 
the production process (task additivity, substitutability or complementarity) are chosen by the 
employer in view of limiting the employees’ power. On the other hand, the specialized 
employee gains power and with it the possibility of modifying the characteristics of the non-
human assets. It is this alteration of the assets – which in the GHM models is equivalent to a 
change in technology – that reduces the value of outside options for the owner. But how does 
the employee actually affect the non-human assets? In seeking to become indispensable to the 
owner, the employee attempts to create idiosyncrasies between the assets he has access to and 
his own human assets.18 
                                                 
16
 Rajan and Zingales insist on the fact that “the agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new 
residual rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and 
make herself valuable. When combined with her preexisting residual right to withdraw her human capital, access 
gives her the ability to create a critical resource that she controls: her specialized human capital. Control over 
this critical resource is a source of power” (ibid., p.388, emphasis in original) 
17
 As an example, consider that this exclusive right may be effective simply by hiring one agent per given task 
(or given job), with the enforcement of the exclusive right depending on the characteristics of the other tasks.  
18
 The account of this process of the employee making himself indispensable by acting directly on asset 
characteristics is destined to explain the power of managers vis-à-vis the shareholders. 
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Asymmetric information 
 
At this stage of the analysis, the manner by which the employer’s authority is somewhat 
countered by the employee’s power remains unclear. In fact, the situation seems one of pure 
conflict. Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) contribution allows a better understanding of how these 
powers stabilize via a delegation mechanism. In their model of the allocation of formal and 
real authority19 based on informational asymmetries, authority can be delegated from a 
superior to a subordinate by virtue of the former’s asset ownership.20 In discussing Weber’s 
rational and legal authority, Aghion and Tirole note that “officials, employees, and workers 
attached to the administrative staff of a bureaucracy do not themselves own the nonhuman 
means of production and administration, yet they may exert substantial control over the 
bureaucratic machinery” (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, p.2). With formal authority defined as the 
right to make decisions and real authority as the effective control over decisions, the model 
illustrates the following decision-making process: the subordinate, i.e., the agent, suggests a 
potential project to the principal, who may or may not accept it, depending on the costly 
information gathered about the project.21  
 
The benefits of delegating formal authority are of two types: first, delegation increases the 
agent’s incentives to acquire information and, second, delegation ensures his continued 
participation in the contractual relation. The delegation of authority stimulates the agent’s 
initiative, mainly in the sense of an increased exertion of effort. As a counterpart, the 
principal’s costs of delegation are measured by the loss of real and formal control over the 
agent’s actions. Therefore, delegation of a particular task or set of tasks results from trading 
off these costs and benefits. Individual rationality constraints are clearly derived from the 
multi-task model. All else being equal, delegation is a suitable solution for the “decisions (or 
activities) that are relatively unimportant for the principal; for which the principal can trust 
the agent; that are important to the agent” (ibid., p.27). Initiative and participation are thus the 
complementary determinants of the allocation of formal authority. Furthermore, in the 
absence of delegation, relevant information about the projects is communicated to the 
principal only in the case of sufficiently congruent objectives. If objectives are too dissonant, 
communication is efficient only in the case of delegation. 
 
Finally, what are the factors allowing for improvement in the agent’s initiative with the 
principal retaining formal authority? First of all, a firm is always optimally in a situation of 
overload with this overload situation described as that in which the marginal profit of an extra 
employee is negative. Overload implies that the firm “credibly commit[s] to rewarding 
initiative” (ibid., p.20) because it means that subordinates cannot be fully controlled. Second, 
among other cases, initiative is favored by the existence of multiple principals, by the 
principal’s reputation for intervening only when justified or by urgency of the decision-taking 
                                                 
19
 Formal authority relates to the right to carry out a certain task (who is authorized to perform task x) whereas 
real authority is the effective performance of the task (who actually performs task x). 
20
 That formal authority is in fine derived from asset ownership is reaffirmed forcefully by Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy (1999), henceforth BGM, in order to criticize Aghion and Tirole’s idea that such authority may be 
delegated. In BGM’s perspective, all intra-firm delegation is necessarily informal. However, this point seems at 
odds with the fact that in any firm the organization chart is a formalization of authority delegation.  
21
 This mode of exercise of authority, that may be qualified as “passive”, is in general consonance with Simon’s 
“right to the last word”, described in Administrative Behavior (Simon, 1997, p.182). However, contrary to 
Simon, Aghion and Tirole consider the possible divergence between what the principal has to say and the action 
effectively taken by the subordinate. 
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(urgency increases the probability of the principal rubber-stamping the decision). Finally, for 
obvious reasons, monetary incentives may increase the agent’s initiative. 
 
This model of authority delegation based on asymmetric information is closely related to 
Rajan and Zingales’ arguments. Indeed, the idea according to which the employee’s power 
stems from her specific human assets encompasses that of asymmetric information. The 
agent’s specific information in Aghion and Tirole’s model is akin to the tacit knowledge that 
the agent acquires while specializing in Rajan and Zingales’ model in the sense that it is 
included in the subordinate’s specific human assets. As a consequence, the delegation model 
of authority captures the organizational mechanism of equilibration, the relative balancing out 
of the employer’s authority as seen through the GHM point of view and the limiting power of 
employee as argued by Rajan and Zingales. Aghion and Tirole’s real authority corresponds to 
the employee’s countering power of Rajan and Zingales. The three models, built in an 
incomplete contracting setting, are all the more complementary.  
 
The preceding discussion insists on the emergence of an economy of power in organizations. 
Nevertheless, beyond the conflict dimension of the authority relation, the cooperative 
dimension must also be stressed. 
 
 
Cooperation in the employment relation: the acceptance of the authority relation 
 
Two major contributions to the analysis of intra-firm authority develop the idea that there 
exists an implicit contract between the employer and the employee – Williamson and Kreps. 
While both authors start from a similar stance, i.e., without special reference to the 
employer’s power stemming from the ownership of the non-human assets, the theoretical 
framework developed to account for the implicit contract is quite different. 
 
Williamson’s point of view: the concept of voluntary subordination 
 
In Williamson’s work, reference to the concept of intra-firm authority is recurrent and 
constitutes a major building block of the approach. Authority, seen as a coordination device, 
allows the firm to be distinguished from other governance structures, namely the market and 
various hybrid forms (Williamson, 1991). Authority also plays in essential role in the 
mitigation of opportunistic behavior, should it arise, as well as in the adaptations of the firm 
to environmental changes. Williamson, following Coase (1937), places authority at the center 
of his analysis of the firm and the employment relation: “hierarchy usually implies a superior-
subordinate relationship” (Williamson, 1975, p.XV). The dichotomy between the firm and the 
market being central, the “unified governance structure” is defined as follows: “the 
transaction is removed from the market and organized within the firm subject to an authority 
relation (vertical integration)” (Williamson, 1985, p.75-76). But what are the foundations of 
infra-firm authority in this analysis?  
 
Intra-firm authority is based on several, complementary devices. Williamson’s reasoning is in 
line with Coase (1937), Simon (1951) and Masten (1988) in the sense that the source of 
authority lies in the legal specificities of the employment contract. Legal rules composing the 
institutional environment are, in Williamson’s terms, the “rules of the game” and as such 
constitute resources complementary to the private orderings of the “players” (Williamson, 
1993, p.113). But, in various works, Williamson also repeatedly stresses that the employee, 
upon entering the organization, adheres at least partly to that organization’s objectives. In 
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adopting this implicit contract conception of the employment relation and of authority, 
Williamson (1990) pays homage to Chester Barnard (1938). But the concept is also needed 
for the rest of the theoretical apparatus. 
 
Indeed, “what is referred to as an ‘employment relation’ is commonly associated with 
voluntary subordination” (Williamson, 1975, p.XV). The accent put on voluntary 
subordination is fundamental because in Williamson’s view, agents choose between entering 
a hierarchy and joining some other form of economic organization, such as the peer group. If 
some choose the first alternative that implies authority, then it follows that they do so 
voluntarily since this increases their welfare. In other words, contrary to Hart, for whom 
authority is enforced through the threat of exclusion, in Williamson’s view authority results 
from the free choice of agents who, in considering it beneficial, knowingly consent to it. This 
position resembles the classical concept of “organizational equilibrium” developed by 
Barnard (1938) and further used by Simon (1945) and March and Simon (1958) according to 
which agents trade-off the potential retribution and their implied contribution.22  
 
This point is crucial. Incentives and sanctions eliciting employee “obedience”, while not 
completely absent from the analysis, are secondary in Williamson’s construction, since the 
employees voluntarily accept orders even though only within an “acceptance zone”. 
Incentives are thus designed more to maximize cooperation than to obtain strict obedience. 
The contract between the employee and the employer is implicit: the former obeys the latter 
as long as it is reasonable to believe that the employer will ensure acceptance by fairly 
compensating effort and by respecting the agreed upon ex ante zone of acceptance. This 
analysis allows Williamson to next look at cases in which the employer reneges on the 
implicit contract, e.g., by attempting to grab rents from the employee’s specific human assets. 
 
Williamson thus does not develop a naive, or ideal vision of the employment relation. His 
conception of authority does not exclude the possibility of conflict between the employer and 
the employee. Indeed, in Williamson’s view, the employment relation is not symmetrical: “the 
worker is one of many and the employer can and will realize strategic advantages by making 
an example of one or a few workers, thereby teaching a lesson to the many” (Williamson, 
1985, p.260). It is therefore unfounded to consider that the relation between the employer and 
the employee is symmetrical since this amounts to ignoring this “fundamental disparity” 
(ibid.). 
 
However, Williamson does not relate authority to power, contrary to Hart, though he clearly 
takes interest in the possibility of the employer’s abuse of authority, i.e., “predation” (ibid., 
p.262).23 Here, several devices act as safeguards against such predation. First, unions act in 
order to maintain the terms of the implicit contract. Second, the penalty may come from the 
employees themselves who may choose a minimum level of cooperation instead of 
maximizing their effort. Finally, the employer’s reputation may suffer in which case the 
recruitment of new employees may become difficult. 
 
The fact that the employer-employee relation is asymmetrical from the outset is not 
contradictory with the idea of voluntary subordination. The two aspects are simply 
highlighted at different moments of the employment relation: ex ante, the individual freely 
adheres to the organization’s objectives, i.e., accepts to obey orders, while ex post, this 
acceptance may be revoked if the employer behaves opportunistically. The consensual aspect 
                                                 
22
 Simon (1991) restates his analysis of the employment relation. 
23
 This question is not considered by Hart. 
 13 
of the relation is further stressed when Williamson indicates that employers and employees 
should cooperate even more fully whenever specific human assets are involved.  
 
Williamson’s approach is richer and more complete than the property rights theory. While the 
latter focuses exclusively on the coercive aspect of the employment contract by putting to the 
fore the employer’s ownership of the non-human assets, Williamson highlights the positive 
aspect of the employment relation by insisting on the ex ante voluntary adherence to the 
organization’s objective. Furthermore, Williamson takes into account the possibility of the 
employer’s opportunism, i.e., that the employer may abuse of the authority that was willingly 
transferred to him. In Hart’s work, in which individuals obey mechanically, this question is 
eluded. In this sense, as we shall now argue, Kreps’ work on reputation may be considered in 
Williamson’s line. Reputation facilitates the ex ante adherence to an organization and thus 
authority when contracts are incomplete.  
 
Trust and reputation seen by Kreps 
 
Like Williamson, Kreps considers authority between the employer and an employee as the 
result of an implicit contract between these two agents and not as the consequence of the 
employer’s ownership of non-human assets. Kreps distinguishes between two types of 
transaction: “specified” transactions and “hierarchical” transactions (Kreps, 1990, p.99).24 In a 
specified transaction, as the expression implies, “all terms are spelled out in advance”, 
whereas in a hierarchical transaction, i.e., the transaction related to the implementation of the 
employment relation, “certain terms are left unspecified” (ibid., p.99). In this case, what is 
specified is who, in the face of unforeseen contingencies, holds the authority to determine 
within certain limits the contract’s ex post execution. In other words, “the hierarchical 
superior party, either explicitly or implicitly, has the right to direct the inferior party” (ibid., 
p.113).  
 
This leads Kreps to a meaningful question: “why would anyone ever willingly enter into such 
a contract in the inferior position?” (ibid., p.113). Put differently, why do employees bestow 
the ex post right of specification of the contract to the employer? Surely the employee accepts 
authority because of the expectation that the employer will use it fairly. What then is “the 
source of this faith?” (ibid., p.92) that may be called “trust”? In examining the foundations of 
this trust, Kreps fully recognizes the possibility that the superior may abuse that trust25 as is 
manifest from the proposed trust game (figure 1). If the game is played non-cooperatively and 
only once, A will not trust B. 
                                                 
24
 Kreps notes that this dichotomy is related to that of Simon (1951). 
25
 A problem partly considered by Williamson.   
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Figure 1. The trust game26 
 
 Payoffs
A B
do not trust B
B
A
trust B
abuse A’s trust
honor A’s trust
10 10
- 5 15
0 0
 
 
Kreps next gives the following example of a hierarchical transaction. An employer B hires a 
worker A for a certain task that can be difficult or not. If the task is easy, a compensation of 
$3 is adequate for the employee whereas if the task is difficult, the requited compensation is 
of $13. Kreps crucially assumes that the result is observable but not verifiable, i.e., that the 
contract cannot be enforced. In this case, if the employer and the employee deal only once, the 
transaction will fail as in the trust game above. The employer will abuse the employee’s trust 
by only paying $3 even if the task is difficult. Kreps then considers repeated transactions in 
which future employees refuse to deal with the employer if he is known to abuse employee 
trust. The employer’s reputation, which can be ruined, is thus at the center of the hierarchical 
transaction and the implicit contract linking the superior and the subordinate. Reputation is 
therefore the basis of the implicit self-enforcing trust between the employer and the 
employee.27  
 
Kreps can now provide an answer to his initial question: “Why would anyone ever willingly 
enter into such a contract in the inferior position? It might be because the worst that could 
happen is good enough so that the transaction, even on those terms, is worthwhile. But when 
the superior party has a reputation to protect or enhance, a reputation that turns on how that 
party exercises authority, then the inferior party need not presume the worst. That party can 
count on the superior party to live up to an implicit contract in his or her own interests.” (ibid., 
p.113).  
 
However, reputation remains a fragile coordination mechanism, relying on the conjunction of 
several conditions (Williamson, 1985, p. 395-396, and Baron and Kreps, 1999, p. 557-559). 
The establishment of a reputation supposes means of information dissemination. Given this 
cost, the passage to individual transactions between large numbers is not immediate. Often, 
reputations will be effective only in limited individual networks. Furthermore, for the 
reputation mechanism to work, the transactors need to be able to verify the ex ante 
engagements. Thus, it is necessary to be able to determine ex post which of the parties did not 
cooperate. 
 
                                                 
26
 Cf. Kreps (1990), p.100 
27
 This line of reasoning allows Kreps to stress that it is rational that authority be vested in the hierarchical 
superior.  
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Kreps also considers coordination difficulties and thus the role of authority are the face of 
unforeseen contingencies. Corporate culture, materialized by rules established through 
learning, serves as a focal point for organization members in such cases. For agents in the 
hierarchically inferior position, corporate culture gives a general idea of how the organization 
will react in these particular circumstances. Corporate culture is thus not only a coordination 
device but also a means of ensuring the exercise of hierarchical authority. Indeed, the 
execution and enforcement of these rules by people acting in the name of the firm, i.e., the 
hierarchical superiors, constitute a control device that mitigates the non-observability of their 
actions. 
 
This second part of Kreps’ reasoning seems less convincing than his demonstration of the 
mechanisms of reputation as a foundation of authority28 because of the overall generality of 
the argument and the absence of precision about the learning process and the types of rules 
that emerge. An additional drawback is the vagueness of the nature of authority that Kreps 
assumes. In the paper, it is not fully clear whether Kreps refers to formal authority or to real 
authority. For example, when the employment relation and thus the employment contract are 
defined, the emphasis is clearly on formal authority and reference is made to Simon (1951). 
Yet in other sections, when Kreps is interested in the superior-inferior hierarchical 
relationship, the superior is not necessarily the employer. This relates more to real authority. 
 
This critique notwithstanding, Kreps’ treatment of the acceptance of authority – and thus of 
the possibility of the employer’s abuse of authority – is apposite and develops Williamson’s 
view. Both analyses stress how the individual, upon entering an organization, accepts 
authority knowing that several mechanisms, of which the employer’s reputation, guarantee the 
underlying implicit contract. The contributions of Kreps and Williamson can therefore be 
considered complementary to those that we developed at the outset. Hart explains how the 
employer obtains obedience during the execution of the contract via the threat of exclusion 
from the non-human assets. Williamson and Kreps underline the voluntary ex ante acceptance 
of authority by employees without any use of threats. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The perspectives presented in this paper stress different aspects of the authority relation. We 
have argued that these differences do not mean that the approaches compete with each other 
but rather that they are complementary. The central idea of the paper is that the employer’s 
authority should be apprehended in terms of degree. Reality is necessarily somewhere 
between two poles. On one hand, the degree of authority may be equal to zero. This 
corresponds to the situation in which the employer has no grasp over the subordinates. On the 
other hand, the degree of authority may be equal to one. Correspondingly, this is consistent 
with the situation in which employees have no autonomy whatsoever. Authority in 
organizations should thus be thought of as a shrewd mix of autonomy and control. How is this 
mix accomplished? We have shown that it is the result of the combination of three major 
forces that operate distinctly: the employer’s resources, the employee’s specific human assets 
and their cooperation.  
 
Figure 2 indicates that the employer bases his authority on two different types of resources. 
First, ownership of non-human assets (Hart) gives the employer a real way to exercise 
                                                 
28
 Kreps admits that his exposition is exploratory.  
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authority since it makes the threat of termination credible (1). Second, the institutional 
environment (Masten) reinforces this authority by establishing the legal subordination of the 
employee (2). However, the employee does not endure this authority passively and in fact 
disposes of some resources that limit the effect of the authority. This limiting power (Rajan 
and Zingales), also called real authority (Aghion and Tirole), is based on the specificity of the 
employee’s human assets (3). This being said, it is crucial to understand that the relation is not 
one of pure confrontation. Principles of delegation of authority establish a mechanism internal 
to the employment relation that counterbalances and stabilizes the employer’s power over the 
employee. Finally, authority is not only about imposed constraints. Its voluntary acception by 
an employee entering the organization and the trust that is built through time reveal the 
importance of cooperation (4). 
 
Figure 2. Determinants of the degree of employer authority
The employer’s degree of authority, A, is defined as the following function:
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In sum, the degree of authority, A, of an employer over an employee is an increasing function 
of the employer’s resources, Re, materialized by the more or less pronounced ease of 
termination. Conversely, the employee’s autonomy is an increasing function of the specificity 
of his human assets, Rs. Accordingly higher levels of employee autonomy decrease the 
employer’s degree of authority. Cooperation, C, acts positively on A: the more the level of C 
is high, the less the employer’s decisions are questioned. We distinguish authority from 
authoritarianism. All else being equal, less cooperation leads to more constraints and threats 
from the employer seeking that his orders be carried out. Thus, a high degree of authority is 
compatible with low authoritarian relations if the level of cooperation is high. 
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